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HAVING A SAY: ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’ AS DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
Jennifer A Leitch* 
 
Abstract: Despite the pervasiveness of civil law in Western societies and the impact of its 
judicial creation and administration, citizens are too often bystanders in litigation; they are 
either  represented  by  lawyers,  and/or  increasingly  required  to  resolve  these  problems 
themselves without the assistance of legal representation. In terms of access to justice policy 
and initiatives, the response to this critical problem represents one of the most contested 
issues  on  the  law-and-society  agenda  and  there  have  been  continuing  debates  over  the 
meaning of access, its objectives, and its success. The question that arises in this regard is 
pertinent – can access to justice initiatives empower individuals to meaningfully participate in 
the legal decisions and processes that affect their lives and by extension, the democratic 
process?  This  paper  critically  examines  whether,  given  the  structure  of  the  civil  justice 
system,  participation  by  self-represented  litigants  is  a  legitimate  or  viable  foundation  for 
access to justice initiatives. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
We live in an era in which private law and public law regulate a broad range of every day 
activities  of  life.  Many  aspects  of  citizens’  lives  and  the  problems  that  an  individual 
experiences in a modern bureaucratic society incorporate a legal dimension.1 Elements of 
personal injury, consumer relations, and debt, as well as almost all areas of economic and 
social interaction are regulated by the law. In a common law system, decisions about familial 
relationships, housing, and employment made in the traditional legal institutions, such as civil 
law courts as well as various regulatory and/or administrative regimes, are just some of the 
types of decisions that can affect individuals’ lives in significant ways. Courts ‘create a body 
of law that directly governs and indirectly guides, through both the full light and the shadow 
of the common law, much of what we do in our daily lives, including both individuals and 
corporate  action’.2 Notwithstanding  the  pervasiveness  of  civil  law  in  our  society  and  the 
impact of its creation and administration on our lives, the reality is that citizens are too often 
bystanders in such matters; they are either represented by lawyers, and/or required to resolve 
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these problems themselves without the assistance of legal representation. In effect, the history 
of court processes and the development of law within these court processes has involved a 
stylised conversation between elite judges and lawyers from which ordinary citizens were 
typically  excluded  and,  even  if  included,  with  which  those  ordinary  citizens  had  little 
familiarity or dexterity. 
As  a  ‘retrospectively  looking  public  dispute  resolution  system,  as  well  as  a 
predictable, accessible, and just prospectively looking common law based-regulatory regime’, 
superior courts ‘clearly  play a central regulatory role in rule-of-law-based democracies’.3 
Consequently, it is acknowledged that law-making by courts is a historical and institutional 
fact of common law jurisdictions.4 As such, it is vital that as many citizens as possible play 
meaningful and informed roles in the process. 5 However, with respect to the courts’ law-
making  function,  there  is  ongoing  debate  and  discussion  about  both  the  legitimacy  and 
effectiveness of this function from a democratic perspective.6 More specifically, there is a 
criticism that the courts should adhere to a policy of judicial restraint in decision -making in 
recognition of the supremacy of the elected bodies’ law-making powers. 
Pursuant  to  this  critique,  the  engagement  by  courts  in  law-making  processes  is 
illegitimate  and  undemocratic.  Antithetical  to  this  criticism  is  a  further  critique  that 
challenges the ability of the existing court system to affect positive social change and instead, 
through its law-making function, maintains existing power relationships.7 A later section of 
this paper engages in a further critical examination of the role of the civil justice system in a 
democratic society. Notwithstanding the critiques proffered in respect of the role that courts 
do or should play in a liberal democracy, one of the pressing challenges in a society that 
claims to be democratic is to bring the work of the courts as much as possible in line with the 
demands and disciplines of democratic principles and practice. This challenge has become 
particularly relevant given the fact that a significant number of individuals are compelled to 
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enter this process overwhelmed and under-prepared. This strongly suggests a crucial failing 
in democratic governance. Moreover, this troubling state of affairs is particularly acute in the 
case of self-represented litigants and, thus, has important implications for access to justice. 
In terms of the state of legal self-representation, one recent report in Ontario suggests 
that approximately 40% of civil law litigants represent themselves; this percentage increases 
dramatically in certain legal fields such as family law where the percentage is as high as 60-
70%.8 Moreover, as retainers run out and clients are unable to pay their mounting legal bills, 
the  percentage  of  self -represented  litigants  also  increases. 9  Low  and  moderate -income 
individuals are disproportionately among those likely to be self-represented.10 The American 
scholar Deborah Rhode has suggested ‘the poor experience more legal difficulties than the 
average [person]’ and are less likely to be in a position to address their problems without 
assistance.11 In this regard, empirical research has demonstrated  that there is a strong link 
between unresolved legal problems and social exclusion.12 Social exclusion is, in turn, both a 
cause and effect of individuals experiencing justiciable problems. More often than not, these 
individuals experience a combination of  problems that include ‘unemployment, poor skills, 
low income, poor housing, high crime and family breakdown’. Alone or in combination, 
these problems perpetuate disempowerment and alienation, thereby making it difficult for 
individuals to resolve issues on their own and almost impossible to affect justice in their 
lives.13 Furthermore, this disempowerment and corresponding inability to access justice in 
order to address their issues or problems leads to individuals’ continued disengagement from 
the law-making and law-administering processes that impact their lives in a myriad of ways. 
This  disengagement de-legitimises the authority of the legal  system,  the rule of law  and 
broader principles of democracy. In light of the cyclical nature  perpetuated by a lack of 
access  of  justice,  these  consequences  can  be  particularly  severe  for  individuals  who  are 
already marginalised in society. 
 
                                                 
8 Julie MacFarlane, ‘Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants’, Final Report of the 
National Self-Represented Litigants Project (May 2013) 86. 
9 Ontario Bar Association,  ‘Getting it Right-The Report of the Ontario Bar Association Justice Stakeholders 
Summit’ (June 2007). 
10 Although low and moderate -income individuals are disproportionately self -represented, recent empirical 
research in Canada suggests that 50% of the self -represented litigants interviewed had a university degree and 
approximately 40% of those interviewed had an income of over $50,000 per year. This appears to suggest that 
the demographics of self-represented litigants may be changing. MacFarlane (n 8) 8. 
11 Deborah L Rhode, Access to Justice (OUP 2004) 103. 
12 Melina Buckley, ‘Moving Forward on Legal Aid: Research on Needs and Innovative Approaches’ (Report for 
the Canadian Bar Association June 2010) 40. 
13 ibid. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
79 
B.  THE DEMOCRATIC THESIS OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The response to these critical problems in terms of access to justice policies and initiatives 
represents one of the most contested issues on the law-and-society agenda. There have been 
continuing debates over its meaning, its objectives, and its success. One of the manifestations 
of these issues involves a more basic policy debate about the overall ambitions for access to 
justice – is the goal to improve people’s access to the legal process (through various forms of 
legal representation) so as to increase their chances of achieving a more positive outcome in 
their individual legal matter (the practical thesis), or is it so as to enhance their participation 
and ultimately their ability to engage with law-making institutions and processes as well as 
concepts of justice as ends in themselves (the democratic thesis)? 
The discussion about access to justice in this paper is premised on the democratic 
thesis. In accordance with this broader approach to access to justice, the means by which an 
individual participates  span a spectrum  from self-representation  through to  representation 
with the assistance of lawyers whose ambition and expertise are directed toward encouraging 
clients  to  share  in  the  decision-making  processes  that  affect  them  and  enhancing  their 
empowerment and participation. Unlike the practical thesis, which is more narrowly limited 
to the efforts necessary to achieve a favourable outcome in a particular legal matter through 
access to traditional legal representation, the democratic thesis is more broadly focused on 
encouraging  individuals’  engagement  in  law-making  as  well  as  law-administering 
institutions. In contrast to the traditional role and function of the lawyer and pursuant to the 
democratic thesis, the role of the lawyer is to facilitate the individual’s engagement in the 
various decision-making processes that affect them. This role recognises that, within most 
democratic societies, lawyers are uniquely positioned to know the legal rules and processes as 
well as being trained to employ a particular type of reasoning that many individuals may need 
to understand in order to participate meaningfully.14 
In accordance with this broader conceptualisation of access to justice, it is necessary 
to situate the discussion of access to justice theory and initiatives within the broader discourse 
about participatory democracy and the democratic ben efits and objectives associated with 
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increased citizen participation.  In other words,  participatory democracy is  used as  a lens 
through which to examine access to justice. Recent literature on the topic of access to justice 
highlights the fact that an important aspect of enhanced access should contemplate citizens 
being able to participate equally in the creation and administration of law. By contrast, the 
failure to promote participation leads to continued disengagement by the citizenry that is 
inconsistent with democratic principles, and among other concerns, leads to a corresponding 
loss of legitimacy in the legal institutions where law is made and applied.15 Based on the dual 
role  of  courts  within  ‘rule-of–law-based  democrac[ies]’,  there  is  a  strong  argument  that 
access to justice theory should take account of direct citizen involvement in adjudicatory law-
making processes. Thus, taking account of both the criticisms and the practical reality of the 
courts’ law-making function, the focus of this paper is not to suggest that litigation (and the 
justice system more generally) is the only forum in which participation should be fostered but 
rather that, as a political process, it plays an important role in constructing and administering 
law in a democratic society and as such, it is legitimised by meaningful citizen engagement. 
Moreover, from a pragmatic standpoint, an approach to access to justice that is informed by 
principles of participatory democracy and focused on promoting meaningful participation by 
those engaged with the justice system is consistent with the evolving modern realities of self-
representation in that same justice system. 
The question that arises in this regard is pertinent – can access to justice initiatives 
empower individuals to meaningfully participate in the legal decisions and processes that 
affect their lives and, by extension, the democratic process? However, prior to undertaking 
this analysis and offering some tentative suggestions for reform in the field of access to 
justice policy, it is necessary to canvas some of the principles associated with participatory 
democracy and to  assess the criteria by which it might be possible to  assess meaningful 
participation in the relevant legal processes and institutions. Thus, the goal of this paper is to 
examine access to justice theory and initiatives from the perspective of meaningful citizen 
participation, consistent with the principles of participatory democracy. In the next section, I 
will examine an emerging concept of access to justice that contemplates an expanded concept 
of access  by individuals to  the law-making  and law-administering institutions  in  society. 
Following this, I will offer a brief review of the concept of participatory democracy including 
some of the objectives, benefits and challenges associated with enhanced citizen participation 
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in a democratic society. The final section of the paper will explore the relationship between 
access  to  justice and the principles  of participatory democracy and in  so  doing critically 
examine whether, given the structure of the civil justice system and the inherent weaknesses 
in  that  structure  particularly  as  they  relate  to  participation  by  self-represented  litigants, 
meaningful participation is a legitimate or viable foundation for developing access to justice 
initiatives. 
 
C.  THE EVOLUTION OF ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’ AS A MEANS TO 
PROMOTE GREATER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
In North America, scholars have characterised the development of access to justice theory 
and  the  corresponding  initiatives  that  were  shaped  by  these  theoretical  considerations  as 
occurring in waves starting in the 1960s.16 The first wave saw the birth of poverty law and the 
development of ‘storefront’ legal clinics that were aimed at providing legal services to low-
income individuals. At this time, there was also a focus on procedural rights in criminal law 
and the development of civil rights litigation.17 The second wave of access to justice through 
the 1970s scrutinised the judicial system’s performance regarding the procedures used in both 
the criminal and civil context, and in concluding that these procedures were sometimes slow, 
inefficient, and inconsistent, explored alternative dispute mechanisms outside the traditional 
justice system.18 
Through the 1980s, a third wave of access to justi ce reforms focused on issues of 
equality and the development of substantive measures that were aimed at ensuring equality in 
legal outcomes as well as procedures.19 Through the 1990s, there was a growing recognition 
by legal scholars that access to justice would need to include access to non-traditional means 
of resolving disputes as well as provide better access to public legal education in order that 
citizens could understand their rights and responsibilities and gain access to the law -making 
                                                 
16 Marc Galanter, ‘Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability’ (2010) Fordham Urb LJ 37 (1) 
115 
17 Roderick MacDonald, ‘Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions’ in Julia Bass, WA 
Bogart and Frederick H Zemans (eds) Access to Justice for a New Century-The Way Forward (Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2005) 19 
18 ibid  20.  Laura Nader expresses a skepticism regarding the development of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) mechanisms as a means of resolving disputes outside the courtroom. Specifically, she questions whether 
instead of improving access to justice, ADR is in fact an unregulated process that is motivated by a desire to 
unburden the courts and control the populace, neither goal of which served the justice interests of the ordinary 
person. Laura Nader,  ‘Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary People),’ (1990) 10 
Windsor YB Access Just 496, 511. 
19 MacDonald (n 17) 20-21. Having a Say: ‘Access to Justice’ as Democratic Participation 
82 
processes.20 It was during this time that government  in Canada sought to ‘enhance citizen 
participation  in  Parliamentary committees  and the rule-making  hearings of administrative 
bodies in accordance with this expanded concept of access to justice’.21 
Finally, the fifth and most recent wave of access to justice theory has built on and 
responded to some of the themes that have emerged over the past 30 years. The most recent 
approach to  promoting  access  to  justice contemplates enhanced access  to  the  ‘myriad of 
unofficial institutions where law is made and administered’.22 This broader concept of access 
to justice theory informs recent access initiatives, such as self-help legal services, and will 
form a basis for the present analysis. As Roderick MacDonald stated: 
In a liberal democracy, true access to justice requires that all people should have an 
equal right to participate in every institution where law is debated, created, found, 
organized,  administered,  interpreted  and  applied.  This  means  providing  equal 
opportunities for the excluded to gain full access to positions of authority within the 
legal  system.  Improving  access  to  legal  education,  to  the  judiciary,  to  the  public 
service and the police, to Parliament and to various law societies is now seen as the 
best way of changing the system to overcome the disempowerment, disrespect and 
disengagement felt by many citizens.23 
While this approach to access to justice represents a broader concept of what access should 
entail, there is still a tension between this broader concept that is focused on participation in a 
variety  of  legal  and  political  institutions  that  impact  individuals’  lives,  and  a  concept  of 
access that is focused on providing individuals with access to lawyers and legal services as a 
means of obtaining justice. The existing paradigm about what access should include and how 
access achieves justice has largely focused on the belief that access to lawyers will assist 
individuals in getting a better outcome, which is typically defined as justice. Underlying this 
paradigm are certain assumptions about what people are believed to want from the legal 
system, namely to win their case.24 However, part of the explanation for a move toward 
broader conceptualisations of access to justice might lie in the corresponding shift away from 
the traditional dispute resolution process as the exclusive means by which individuals may 
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obtain justice.25 In particular, limitations within the traditional dispute resolution framework 
challenge the idea that litigation is an appropriate forum for a chieving social justice. 26 
Moreover, the evolution of alternative dispute resolution processes has provided individuals 
with an opportunity to have a more direct ‘say’ in the process and, in so doing, participate in 
the resolution of their legal issue in a manner that reflects their own concepts of justice. This 
is contrasted with the passive role traditionally played by clients in the court system. 
In a legal context, the problems associated with disengagement and disempowerment 
are  intertwined  in  the  sense  that  individuals  without  access  cannot  impact  the  laws  and 
policies that affect them and yet can be significantly influenced by the law’s application in 
their life in a variety of intrusive ways. Thus, for scholars such as Janice Gross Stein, Lucie 
White  and  Marc  Galanter,  the  goal  of  improved  access  must  include  engagement  by  all 
citizens  in  the  legal  and  political  processes  that  affect  them  as  opposed  to  access  that 
contemplates more reliance on legal professionals. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary 
that citizens, with the aid of legal information and advice, become able to participate directly 
in the development of a new language of law. This, in turn, further fosters citizens’ ability to 
both understand and participate in the legal system.27 
From a practical standpoint, the development of a new language of law necessarily 
involves the de-mystification of the law by making it less technical and more relevant to the 
ordinary citizens that it purports to regulate. 28 It is this de-mystification of law and legal 
processes that contributes  to  the development of a new ‘legal  vernacular’ through which 
citizens ‘participate in redefining, reforming and shaping the law and its institutions’29. In 
contrast, the continued mystification of law and its processes is reinforced, in part, by a 
traditional approach to the practice of law whereby lawyers adopt certain roles characterised 
by a sense of objectivity and a need to re-constitute the client’s political/social/economic 
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issue as an abstract legal issue.30 However, Lucie White suggests that the practice of law has 
cultural meaning and, as such,  should include a dialogue about social justice. 31 Thus, to the 
extent that individuals are able to move away from the traditional roles played by clients and 
lawyers and, in so doing, engage in these conversations in a more direct fashion, they may be 
able to participate in the development of legal norms of justice and equality that are reflective 
of their own lives and experiences. 
In a similar vein, Benjamin Barber suggests that terms such as ‘justice’ are not to be 
understood as abstract terms, but rather as political values that cannot be apprehended or 
practised except in the setting of citizenship.32 Moreover, the concepts of democracy and 
justice are contingent and interdependent such that justice is not sustainable when delivered 
as a command and democracy is weak when it is restricted to counting votes as a means of 
obtaining a political outcome.33 Through democratic dialogue, terms such as justice become 
the subject of debate, challenge, valuation and transformation in accordance with the needs 
and circumstance of the particular political communities. 34 This is not to suggest that the 
terms are only relative and relevant to the immediate will of the populace, but rathe r that the 
terms  are  truly  reflective  of  a  citizenship  that  has,  through  meaningful  dialogue  and 
deliberation, encapsulated certain ideas and perspectives. Within the context of access to 
justice, it is important to remember that in a modern democracy, a s ignificant portion of this 
dialogue and deliberation concerning concepts such as justice and equality occurs in the 
justice system. 
From the standpoint of access to justice, the question is whether the promotion of 
more direct participation by individuals consistent with a theory of participatory democracy 
could, in turn, contribute to the demystification of law and existing legal processes necessary 
to develop law that is more inclusive and reflective of the citizenry that it purports to 
regulate. This question also raises queries about whether the participation encouraged must 
necessarily be direct in the sense of individuals representing themselves or whether direct 
participation might also contemplate legal representation of individuals by lawyers. 
In the context of self-representation, the influx of self -represented parties into the 
judicial system could advance the development of a ‘new legal vernacular’ developed by the 
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very citizens that the law purports to regulate. As previously noted, an important component 
of the development of this ‘new legal vernacular’ necessarily includes the demystification of 
law and related legal processes. As such, the aspirations regarding the creation of a ‘new 
legal vernacular’ assume that there is a corresponding shift pursuant to which individuals are 
‘disabused of the tendency to confer undue authority on all kinds of experts’35 and a move 
away from the assumption that participation in legal institutions has historically been the 
exclusive domain of the legal profession.  In this regard, the control  exerted by the legal 
profession over the formation and interpretation of the law and the corresponding exclusion 
of ordinary citizens from the legal process has contributed to the continued reliance on legal 
professionals to define and obtain justice and the corresponding disengagement by citizens 
from the legal decision-making processes where justice is defined.36 
Underscoring a broader approach to access strategy that contemplates a spectrum of 
initiatives is the concern that, in order to participate in legal processes and institutions in a 
meaningful manner, individuals will require different levels of assistance with procedural 
law, substantive law and even the application of legal reasoning. 37 This is consistent with 
scholars such as Wexler, Simon, and Lopez who envisage a different role for lawyers; a role 
in which lawyers encourage and facilitate client engagement in the decisions about their case 
and in dialogue about law more generally. This type of lawyering is different  from the 
traditional  approach  to  lawyering  in  which  lawyers  as  ‘professionally  trained  technical 
experts’38 assume responsibility for their client’s legal matters and the client, as a private 
citizen, remains in the background. Gabel and Harris suggest that the result of ‘conveying this 
professional mystique to our clients, and by transforming the action that brought them to a 
lawyer into an abstract legal matter, we [lawyers] contribute to the clients’ powerlessness’.39 
In  contrast  to  traditional  ideas  about  lawyering  and  consistent  with  a  broader 
conceptualisation  of  access,  democratic  or  rebellious  lawyers  engage  in  non-hierarchical 
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states  ‘nevertheless,  fluency  in  the  law  –  that  is,  a  deep  practical  understanding  of  law  as  a  discourse  for 
articulating norms of justice and an array of rituals for resolving social conflict – will greatly improve a person's 
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partnerships  with  clients  whereby  lawyers  encourage  client  participation  in  the  legal 
decisions  and  strategies  that  affect  their  cases  as  well  as  the  implementation  of  these 
decisions.40 This approach is consistent with the democratic principle that ‘no single person 
should have sole responsibility for making and implementing [such] decisions’.41 Lawyers 
and clients deliberate together to both frame the issue and then implement the decided-upon 
strategies in  addressing  the issue. One of the  challenges  for democratic lawyers as  legal 
experts is to resist the temptation to take over the process when it becomes difficult or ‘place 
pressure  on  subordinated  groups  to  formulate  their  interests  in  forms  that  the  law  can 
process’.42 To do so would entail a reversion to a more formal representative democratic 
approach consistent with ‘learned guardians in charge of tending to the interests of others 
without their active participation’.43 
Carrie  Menkel-Meadow  suggests  that  if  democratic  participation  is  a  process  to 
improve  public  order  and  social  justice  then  lawyers,  acting  for  parties  or  groups  or  by 
otherwise facilitating new participatory forums and procedures, have an important role in 
these processes.44 For example, in consensus-building processes that are aimed at enhancing 
participation in law-making and political decision-making, lawyers may be able to help in 
constructing participatory processes and facilitating the administration of these processes in 
order to ensure that all those wishing to participate are heard. 45 Moreover, by engaging with 
lawyers, learning about various legal processes, and devising solutions to address their issues 
and concerns, clients relinquish their reliance on experts. 46 In doing so, they begin to have a 
direct ‘say’ in the legal decision-making that affects their lives and, arguably, in law-making 
processes more generally. 
 
D.   DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 
The essence of democracy is that it engages ordinary people in government and governance.47 
It contemplates a ‘regime of popular self-government which not only allows for, but relies 
upon participation by citizens in the formulation and enactment of laws that govern their 
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lives’. 48  In  its  strong  incarnation,  therefore,  democracy  encompasses  ‘politics  in  the 
participatory  mode  where  conflict  is  resolved  in  the  absence  of  an  independent  ground 
through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation of a 
political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals in to free citizens 
and private interests in to public goods’.49 In furthering a concept of strong democracy, the 
question that arises is how best to increase the scope and nature of individuals’ participation 
in the institutions, processes and decision-making that impact their lives. 
Democracy in a participatory mode is not simply about conducting free elections in 
which every citizen is provided with the opportunity to vote. Rather it involves a ‘diffuse and 
urgent hope that the people themselves can become moral and political actors in the civic 
fabric of our society’.50 Subject to casting votes in regularly scheduled elections, citizens in a 
representative system of democracy do not directly participate in the creation of the laws and 
policies  that  govern  them.  As  a  result,  they  become  the  ‘passive  constituents  of 
representatives, who, far from reconstituting the citizens’ aims and interests, usurp their civic 
function and deflect their civic energies’.51 
By contrast, participation requires that citizens  regularly and frequently engage in 
debate,  deliberation  and  decision-making  respecting  the  development  of  policy  and 
deployment of power that impacts their collective lives. The presumption from a theoretical 
standpoint is that communication, dialogue, and deliberation by citizens and decision-makers 
will produce better and more legitimate outcomes.52 The assumption is not that the citizenry, 
as opposed to elected officials, will resolve all of the complicated issues that face modern 
democratic societies, but rather that citizens will participate through dialogue and deliberation 
and, in so doing, develop public ends that reflect the concerns and needs of the citizenry, as  
well as the collective normative value of concepts such as justice and equality. 53 This 
development of public ends and expression of collective normative values is consistent with a 
community that is engaged in acts of collective self-government as opposed to representative 
government or, alternatively, a political system focused almost exclusively on individual 
needs. 
                                                 
48 Hutchinson (n 35) 137. 
49 Barber (n 32) 132. 
50 Guinier (n 33) 27. 
51 Barber (n 32) 147. 
52 Carrie Menkel-Meadow (n 5) 106. 
53 Barber (n 32) 154-155. Participation in this mode contemplates a broad spectrum of activities and goals that 
range from the development of policy and law-making at one end of the spectrum to information exchange and 
deliberation of public issues at the other end of spectrum. Having a Say: ‘Access to Justice’ as Democratic Participation 
88 
In light  of the objectives  associated with  participatory democracy, namely  greater 
citizen engagement, the question that arises is whether these objectives are achievable within 
a representative democracy. Typically, in a representative democracy, elected politicians are 
entrusted to determine what is in the public’s interest and as such, there is little or no further 
need  for  citizen  engagement.54 This  involves  a  distinction  between  individuals  ‘having  a 
vote’ in a representative democracy and individuals ‘having a say’ in the matters that affect 
them.55 From a practical standpoint, this distinction can be particularly significant in respect 
of policies that require that citizens play an active role in the administration of a specific 
policy initiative, such as disease control or environmental protection.56 
Carole Pateman highlights the principles of participatory democracy and ultimately 
concludes that a theory of participatory democracy  is built on a central assertion that 
individuals  and  institutions  cannot  be  considered  in  isolation  from  one  another. 57  In 
answering the question of how greater citizen participation might evolve, Pateman suggests 
that there is a need for the social training of citizens in the ways of democracy in order to 
ensure  that  citizens  are  able  to  maximise  their  participation  within  a  democracy.  She 
envisions this training as occurring in many different spheres of society an d involving ever 
greater acts of participation. The benefit of participating in different social and political 
spheres is that the individual develops ‘attitudes and psychological qualities’ that in turn 
foster further participation.58 Thus, one of the significant functions and effects of democratic 
participation  is  educative.  In  this  regard,  participation  serves  as  a  ‘learning  process  that 
educates citizens with the skills needed to sustain democracy’ including the skill necessary to 
both engage in political processes and be effective in those same processes. As individuals 
participate in making decisions and solving problems, they learn in an experiential manner 
that  leads  to  changes  in  behavior,  confidence  and  leadership.  This,  in  turn,  empowers 
individuals and allows them to expand the nature and scope of their participation.59 
A key component of this process involves the individual as a citizen in the political 
sense. Citizenship is learned through ‘education, socialization, exposure to politics, public 
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life  and  day-to-day  experiences’.60 Benjamin  Barber  distinguishes  between  masses  (as  in 
‘government of the masses’) and citizens. While masses do not govern themselves, citizens 
self-govern through participatory processes.61 Citizenship, as it is considered within a theory 
of participatory democracy, requires more than voting from the individual members of 
society; it requires that individuals actively engage in creating and implementing the political 
and legal rules and processes that shape their lives. This p articipation necessarily entails 
direct deliberation, action and contribution. As noted, in this sense, strong democracy is 
defined as a means of resolving conflict through a participatory process that engages citizens 
in a political community.62 This definition contemplates a public element to citizenship that 
obligates individuals to think and act in common. 
The kind of participation contemplated by Pateman, Barber, and others can exist on a 
small scale as well as a national political scale, in terms of issue, forum and/or geography. In 
fact, the small-scale focus of much participation offers a sense of connectedness because 
people are more  likely to be  comfortable engaging in dialogue and reaching sustainable 
solutions on a small scale as opposed to being  thrust in to large national forums where the 
issues and policy choices can be quite complex.63 In this regard, the local realm can arguably 
become an important site in which to develop collective action by cultivating ‘face-to-face 
settings  and  manageably  sized  groups  in  which  people  talk,  listen  and  think,  and  act 
together’.64 Each encounter by a citizen provides an opportunity for the individual to gain 
self-confidence and knowledge of the community around them. This inculcates the ability to 
negotiate and deliberate which ‘spill[s] over’ from one area of life to another. This ‘spill-
over’ has a cumulative effect on the individual’s ability to engage in different forums.65 
Individuals  also  gain  practice  asserting  democratic  skills,  which  then  potentially 
provide them with the confidence to participate in more complex spheres of decision-making. 
As  this  happens,  participation  becomes  self-sustaining,  because  individuals  voluntarily 
continue  to  use  the  skills  and  information  obtained  to  engage  further  in  debate  and 
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deliberation about the laws and policies that affect them.66 Democracy is then strengthened 
by the fact that input from citizens and the resulting decision -making is derived from wide 
and frequent participation in a variety of contexts and forums.67 In considering the forum, the 
question that arises is whether the civil justice system can or should provide such a space in 
which individuals are able to speak and deliberate with a view to participating and developing 
collective efforts. 
Ever greater citizen participation encourages the development of a community to the 
extent that individuals begin to think publicly as citizens, establish connections to other 
citizens, and, in feeling connected, are prompted to consider the ‘welfare of the community as 
a whole’.68 This process influences the setting of collective goals because all of the members 
of  the  community  are  given  the  opportunity  to  deliberate  over  the  construction  and 
development of those goals.69 Furthermore, related to the concept of community-building is 
the potential for individual self-transformation that is often associated with participation. By 
participating in various decision -making processes, individuals are able to fulfill certain 
‘innate and basic developmental needs for agency and for living up to one’s potential’ which 
reinforces  the  individual’s  sense  of  autonomy. 70 However,  by  engaging  in  debate  and 
dialogue, this autonomy is balanced against the benefits associated with individuals taking 
account  of  other  worldviews  and  becoming  attentive  to  the  interests  of  others. 
Acknowledging that it is not possible to have both significant inequality and meaningful 
participation,71 another prospective benefit of participatory democracy is also the potential to 
create measures and forums that re -engage  those members of society that are presently 
disenfranchised and/or disempowered. By developing avenues through which all citizens are 
given the opportunity to be heard and to affect decision-making, individuals can re-engage as 
members of a community who  begin to think and act in common. This, in turn, works to 
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negate  the  concept  of  the  ‘other’  associated  with  exclusion  and  inequality  and  promote 
inclusivity. 
 
E.  MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION 
Notwithstanding the benefits associated with greater citizen engagement, there are challenges 
to the pivotal notion of ‘meaningful participation’. First and foremost, there is an assumption 
that any or all participation is good participation. In her article on citizen participation, Sherry 
Arnstein disputes this idea. She maintains that participation must result in the real possibility 
for redistributing power and resources  to  those without resources  or power if it is  to  be 
meaningful and legitimate. This presupposes that the participation will be effective and of 
consequence and that there is a willingness to share power and decision-making authority. 
Failing that, it is an empty process used by those with power to justify a course of action from 
which only certain members of society are likely to benefit.72 
Given this requirement, if participatory democracy is to be effective and beneficial, it 
must  account  for  the  ‘economic  and  social  determinants’  that  potentially  influence 
individuals  in  society  and  affect  their  ability  to  participate  in  a  meaningful  way.73 Lucie 
White suggests that, in many instances, the lack of power held by an individual or a particular 
group in society will not only prevent them being heard but even more fundamentally, 
prevent them from engaging in the discussion at all, thus making any notions of participation 
worthless.74 She maintains that for individuals who are truly subordinated in the sense that 
they are not in a position to express their problems either because they internalise the 
isolation and start to believe it is their fault, or are unable to articulate who is responsible for 
their  situation,  or  further  distrust  the  existing  legal  and  political  systems,  it  may  be 
impracticable to suggest that there can be is meaningful participation without making changes 
to the allocation of social power, thereby increasing these individuals’ power.75 
The  consequence  of  not  providing  legitimate  means  by  which  power  can  be  re-
distributed is that the participation remains ‘cosmetic’ in nature and potentially leads to the 
deeper marginalisation of certain stakeholders.76 This deeper sense of marginalisation results 
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from the entrenchment of the belief that only certain voices will be heard and only certain 
viewpoints are actually considered in the decision-making process. The likely outcome in this 
scenario  is  not  only  the  continued  exclusion  of  certain  individuals  and  groups  from  the 
dialogue, deliberation and decision-making processes but also a further entrenchment of the 
belief  that  only  certain  individuals  or  groups  are  worthy  of  being  heard.  This  results  in 
continued disengagement by those who have been excluded historically. Thus, without the 
ability to impact the decision-making process, which necessarily implies that power is shared 
among the relevant stakeholders, participation may prove to be an empty engagement. 
There is also a practical reality that, while the majority of individuals may ‘possess 
the  intuitive  capacity  to  reason  practically  and  therefore  participate  in  political  decision-
making,  it  is  naïve  to  assume  communicative  skills  are  distributed  equally  in  society’.77 
Moreover,  even  if  it  is  assumed  that  all  individuals  are  capable  of  participating,  many 
individuals are busy with their own lives; they have neither the time nor the inclination to 
participate  in  various  political  processes.  In  such  circumstances,  there  is  a  concern  that 
participatory democracy will fail to achieve the critical mass of committed political citizens 
that is necessary to meet the ambitions of participatory democracy. 
In addressing these concerns, there are several considerations. First, it should be noted 
again that, while not all citizens are prepared to participate in every decision-making process, 
what is important is that individuals understand that they can participate if they so choose: the 
requisite political and democratic institutions are designed for and encourage participation. 
The forums and contexts in which citizens participate are expanded and made accessible. 
Accepting the reality that not all citizens will participate in all decision-making processes, 
Benjamin Barber stated ‘if all of the people can participate some of the time in some of the 
responsibilities of governing, then strong democracy will have realized its aspiration’.78 By 
contrast, the failure of individuals to exercise willingly their power to participate may have 
less to do with their ability to do so and more to do with the fact that the present political 
system  excludes  all  except  certain  specialists  and  experts  who  engage  in  the  day-to-day 
political activity on behalf of the populace through a representative democracy and, in so 
doing, perpetuate a language and process that is unfamiliar to ordinary citizens.79 
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Second, while individuals may be frustrated with politicians and political processes as 
they presently exist in a representative democracy, it does not mean that they do not want or 
are not interested in having a voice and role in the policies, rules and decisions that affect 
their daily lives and the lives of their communities. Experience would suggest that, to the 
extent that participation begets further and expanded participation, individuals want more 
participation and engagement, not less – so long as it is meaningful. However, as Arnstein 
and White note, fostering meaningful participation requires a re-distribution of power such 
that those who have been excluded historically are able to engage and those who have held 
power are prepared to relinquish it. Such a redistribution of power must take account of 
existing and inadequate socio-economic infrastructure, differences in knowledge bases and 
difficulties  faced by certain groups who have been impacted by historical  alienation and 
distrust.80 These considerations involve a gamble that those who have historically been 
disengaged  and  disempowered  will  be  in  a  better  position  to  place  themselves  in  the 
conversation and ultimately the decision-making processes. 
Given  these  challenges,  if  participation  is  to  be  effective,  it  is  important  that 
participation is fostered in a variety of forums and institutions that contemplate individuals 
participating on a local level. By offering a variety of forums and avenues for participation, 
individuals  are  able  to  gain  the  experience,  skills,  self -confidence  and  knowledge  that 
promote further participation. However, this  also means that participation will not lo ok or 
operate the same in all areas of political, social and economic life. 81 The very nature and 
structure of a particular participatory process may be influenced by theoretical frameworks of 
deliberative democracy and discourse theory, questions of operationalization, and differing 
participatory objectives.82 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all individuals will participate in all forums or 
decision-making processes. Rather, the goal is that individuals are able to participate as they 
choose, particularly in situations where the policies being decided affect their lives and/or 
where ‘significant power is being deployed’83 against them. In these instances, it is important 
that the requisite political and legal institutions provide for and encourage engagement at a 
variety of different stages and in different ways. To accomplish this, there is also a need for 
corresponding  systematic  institutional  participation  within  the  existing  democratic 
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institutions. However, because many barriers to reform are context-specific, they must be 
examined within the particular forum in which greater participation is sought. At the same 
time, however, if participation is to be sustaining and meaningful, these reforms cannot be 
piecemeal, but rather system-wide and complementary.84 
In considering participation within the specific context of the judicial system, there is 
a particular need to address the disconnect between the traditional legal framework, which 
focuses on an adversarial process undertaken by evenly matched legal pro fessionals, and the 
modern realities that include significant numbers of self -represented litigants who are at 
serious disadvantage when engaging the traditional legal system. Unlike the professional 
lawyers, self-represented litigants suffer from a lack o f knowledge and familiarity with the 
formalised processes and procedures as well as the presence of hostile players (ie lawyers, 
judges, and clerks). Given the modern realit y facing many self -represented litigants, the 
question that will be examined in the  next section is whether self-represented litigants can 
participate in a meaningful manner and what barriers must be addressed in order for them to 
participate. 
The meaningfulness of citizens’ engagement within these institutions will, in part, be 
judged by the actual impact that citizens have on the decision-making process. This is not to 
assume that in every instance the individual was able to change the outcome, but rather that 
the individual was able to ‘have a say’, and their voice was reflected in the decision-making 
process that ensued. Thus, an important component of this is the individual’s belief that they 
were heard.85 Within a participatory context, engaging in dialogue and deliberation differs 
from engaging in traditional political debate. The former approach seeks to ensure that there 
is a considered exchange of different views and perspectives prior to making informed 
decisions.86 In accordance with this approach, a focus on listening as much as speaking would 
foster citizens’ beliefs that their views and perspectives are not only being heard, but also 
being considered. In order to have such an impact, citizens as well as the decision-makers 
must be in a position to communicate; this involves more than simply speaking. Specifically, 
this involves ‘receiving as well as expressing, hearing as well as speaking, and empathizing 
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as  well  as  uttering’.87 Such  communication  plays  an  important  role,  not  just  in  terms  of 
decision-making, but also in terms of ensuring that individuals are able to engage in dialogue 
and  deliberation  before  decisions  are  made.  This  component  of  meaningful  participation 
highlights  a  second  educational  pre-requisite;  namely,  that  individuals  are  provided  with 
access  to  adequate  information  about  the  issues,  processes  and  policies  prior  to  being 
expected to deliberate. 
 
F.  DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
In the particular context of the civil justice system, considerable socio-legal research has 
suggested that when evaluating the fairness or justness of a legal process in which they were 
involved, litigants are more likely to express satisfaction with the legal process if they feel 
that they were able to both speak and be heard by the decision-maker.88 In many instances, 
the litigants’ positive evaluation of the process (and presumably their ability to participate in 
the process) is less tied to a particular outcome in the proceeding and more tied to ‘having a 
voice’.89 Thus, by ensuring that the parties are able to express their viewpoint and be heard in 
a meaningful manner, the parties may begin to feel that the justice system operates fairly 
regardless  of  the  particular  result  obtained  and  thereby  be  more  willing  to  accept  the 
outcome.90 Nowhere is this more significant than in the case of self-represented litigants who 
do not have an advocate speaking on their behalf and, therefore, are  engaged directly in the 
adjudicative process. For self-represented litigants, the wish to have a voice and be heard has 
an immediate and direct impact on their perceptions about the legitimac y of the process and 
their interest in other forms of participation. 
In  the  context  of  access  to  justice,  the  promotion  of  greater  participation  and 
engagement by individuals in the legal institutions and processes that affect them  has the 
effect of strengthening the legitimacy of the justice system as part of the democratic process. 
Direct  participation  in  the  judicial  system’s  law-making  processes  has  the  potential  to 
corroborate  the  democratic  aspects  of  this  law-making  process.  Moreover,  through 
meaningful participation in the development and administration of the laws that govern them, 
individuals will be in a better position to infuse those laws with their own conceptualisations 
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of  justice,  freedom  and  equality;  the  impact  of  which  potentially  extends  beyond  the 
individual’s particular circumstances. 
By engaging directly with the rule-making and rule-administering institutions where 
principles of justice are established and implemented, individuals are in a better position to 
define  justice  in  the  context  of  their  everyday  life  and  in  their  encounters  with  public 
officials.91 In this sense, the gap between institutions and citizens will be better bridged and 
even abridged. This is accomplished in part by creating an ‘enabling environment’ in which 
the  barriers  to  participation  are  removed. 92 Creating  an  environment  that  expands  the 
opportunities for citizens to participate is an important consideration in the civil justice 
context, where barriers have resulted in the continued exclusion of ordinary citizens  from 
those legal institutions. This continued exclusion has led to extensive discussions and debates 
within the access to justice literature regarding the best means to address these barriers. Some 
of the barriers experienced by non-lawyers when attempting to access the civil justice system 
will be briefly discussed in a later section of this paper. 
In examining whether access to justice policies might benefit from the infusion of 
participatory principles, it is important to canvas some of the objectives associated with the 
promotion of participation in order to determine whether such goals are consistent with, or 
achievable in the context of, access to justice initiatives. As noted, one of the goals associated 
with greater citizen participation is the collective acceptance of the decisions made in the 
course  of  participation.  To  the  extent  that  individuals  are  able  to  provide  opinions  and 
deliberate on the issues that affect them, it is believed that they will be more willing to abide 
by the decisions that are made in this way. This does not mean that every decision will be 
reached through consensus, nor does it mean that all participating individuals will be satisfied 
with the result obtained in every situation, but it does mean that citizens are provided with the 
opportunity  to  deliberate,  to  take  action  and,  in  some  instances,  revisit  issues  previously 
decided upon when changes in society dictate.93 
Thus, while the opportunity to be heard may seem like small or cold consolation for 
the party that loses their case; safeguarding the right to be heard contributes to the overall 
legitimacy of the justice system and citizens’ confidence in the fairness of a legal process. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of decisions affecting self-represented litigants 
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who are typically compelled to engage the civil justice system on their own and, in so doing, 
are unfamiliar with the processes and procedures used by the lawyers and judges. 
 
G. A CASE STUDY ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE FROM CONNECTICUT 
By way of confirmation, anthropological research conducted in respect of a participatory 
democracy project highlights the importance of a participating citizenry, the link between 
participation  and  community-building  and  the  corresponding  benefits  associated  with 
‘democratic participation’ as a means for individuals to access justice in society.94 
A community lawyer project was undertaken in Winsted, Connecticut. A lawyer was 
hired to assist members of the town in building civic education and participation at the local 
level. Local government did not hire the lawyer; she was funded through a private charitable 
organisation. The lawyer’s task was to provide individuals in the community with the ‘means 
by  which  they  could  translate  personal  concerns  about  the  community  into  community 
action’.95 By providing individuals with information on the relevant law and procedures of 
local government, advising them on the use of media and lobbying, attending public meetings 
to ensure that officials followed procedures and compiling information regarding emerging 
issues  in  the  community,  the  lawyer  was  able  to  assist  citizens  ‘participate  and  become 
involved in the process of governing themselves’. In describing her role in the community, 
the lawyer stated that ‘citizens without adequate information cannot exercise their rights and 
do  not  know  what  to  expect  from  their  government  because  they  do  not  know  what  to 
demand’  or  presumably  how  to  make  demands.96 This  lack  of  information  was  seen  as 
directly impacting the citizens’ capacity to engage in public dialogue and this, in turn, further 
undermined both the ability of the citizenry to participate in the decision-making process and 
the accountability of the governing officials. 
The  nexus  between  a  lack  of  information  about  rights  and  processes  and  an 
individual’s incapacity to engage in the democratic process at any level is relevant in the 
context of access to justice, and even more particularly relevant to self-represented litigants’ 
participation in the civil justice system. The community lawyer project provides a concrete 
example where the dissemination of legal information and related skills was thought to have a 
direct impact on citizens’ ability to participate and ultimately self-govern. In light of the fact 
that certain access to justice initiatives are directed at providing self-represented litigants with 
                                                 
94 Nader (n 18) 505-508. 
95 ibid 505 
96 ibid 506. Having a Say: ‘Access to Justice’ as Democratic Participation 
98 
legal  information  and  advice  so  that  they  may  navigate  the  civil  justice  system  more 
effectively, it could be argued that such initiatives, like the community lawyer project, could 
promote opportunities for greater citizen participation by providing much needed information 
and advice about a particular legal process. Thus, to the extent that access to justice theory is 
informed by principles of participatory democracy, a question that arises is how access to 
justice initiatives might be developed to further promote meaningful participation. Related to 
this  are  questions  about  how  such  initiatives  might  dovetail  with  new  approaches  to 
lawyering,  such  as  democratic  lawyering,  which  assist  individuals  in  asserting  their  own 
voice and engaging in the legal decisions and processes that affect them. The challenge in 
substantiating these initiatives is to account for the myriad issues that arise when examining 
the specific nature of an individual’s participation in the civil justice system. 
 
H. CIVIL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
The civil justice system is a significant component of a democratic society.97 In addition to 
resolving the private disputes of parties that come before them, courts and the judges who sit 
in these courts perform a distinctly political process within a democrac y  –  namely  rule-
making and rule-administering, whether it be in a private, public or constitutional context. 
Within common law jurisdictions, law-making by courts is a historical and institutional fact. 
In a paper on the legal profession, the Canadian Chief Justice McLachlin stated: 
[C]ourts are seen as ways of compensating for the weaknesses of electoral decision-
making  and  contributing  to  deliberative  democracy  by  providing  a  forum  where 
citizens can test laws for conformity to the fundamental values upon which the society 
is premised … [these values] … are fundamental to deliberative democracy, the goal 
of which is decisions that best represent the interests of the community as [a] whole. 
Independent courts thus emerge as an essential condition of democracy. 98 
However, there is the question of whether the work undertaken by lawyers and judges within 
the framework of the civil justice system is compatible with the commitments  of a truly 
democratic society. In a democratic society, the civil justice system is engaged in the 
adjudication of legal rights and the delineation of legal duties and responsibilities by an 
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independent  appointed  judiciary.  Courts,  through  the  creation  and  application  of  law, 
construct the ways in which individuals’ real life problems are situated within a particular 
legal  framework  and  then  subjected  to  a  range  of  possible  solutions  that  have  been 
established within that same legal framework. In the course of this process, the lawyers and 
judges who participate in the justice system engage in critical political discussions that shape 
not only the content of the laws but also the underlying values and norms adopted by and 
reflected  in  society.  One  manifestation  of  this  norm  creation  occurs  in  the  context  of 
precedental judgments whereby judges are not only resolving private parties’ disputes but 
also engaging in the regulation of future behavior and the future outcome of similarly situated 
parties in similarly situated cases or negotiated settlements.99 
The civil justice system articulates citizens’ legal rights and duties. In some instances, 
the system will protect citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the state. However, the judicial process is 
criticised as being inconsistent with democratic principles: while it may be ‘for the people,’ it 
is  certainly  not  ‘by  the  people’. 100 As  previously  noted,  the  civil  justice  system  has 
historically involved a conversation between the judiciary and an elite legal profession that 
has  precluded  direct  participation  by  ordinary  citizens  except  in  rare  instances. 
Notwithstanding the increase in self-represented parties and attempts to make the institutional 
processes user-friendly, the legal language spoken in the civil justice system continues to be 
the specialist vernacular of lawyers; all of this makes it very difficult for ordinary citizens to 
participate  in  the  process  without  legal  representation.  Despite  this  difficulty,  growing 
numbers of individuals are compelled to proceed without legal representation.101 As a result, 
many self-represented litigants express anxiety, frustration, powerlessness, and ultimately 
disengagement when they appear in court without legal assistance.102 Moreover, to the extent 
that we acknowledge the political nature of the adjudication process and the important role 
that it plays in a democracy, the fact that a significant portion of individuals are compelled to 
enter this process overwhelmed and under-prepared, suggests a crucial failing of democracy. 
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I.  OPERATIONAL AND ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS TO ACCESS 
Operational barriers inherent in civil justice procedures make it difficult for non-lawyers to 
manoeuvre through the system. Court staff are not typically in a position to provide extra 
assistance to self-represented parties who are unfamiliar with the court processes. Moreover, 
this assistance has historically been viewed as involving the provision of legal advice, which 
only lawyers are regulated to provide in most jurisdictions. Complicating matters further is 
the fact that individual courts may invoke different practices and procedures that are only 
familiar to the lawyers who regularly attend that particular court. In light of these concerns, 
there have been some efforts to re-design court processes in order to ensure that the civil 
justice system is more user-friendly for non-lawyers. For example, streamlined procedures 
and higher monetary limits in small claims courts where most self-represented individuals 
appear; the inclusion of more duty counsel who can facilitate a self-represented litigants’ 
experience in the civil justice system; and the simplification of court forms which incorporate 
plain language so that non-lawyers can complete the forms without legal assistance, as well 
as the ability to file the forms electronically. These are some of the operational reforms that 
have been undertaken. However, the continuing dilemma is that these initiatives have been 
slow to be implemented, are piecemeal at best when broader overhauls are required, and have 
not been uniformly adopted by all courts. As such, operational and information-based barriers 
as well as procedural barriers to participation remain prevalent in the civil justice system. 
Added  to  these  concerns  are  certain  attitudinal  barriers  prevalent  among  the  key 
players  in  the  civil  justice  system.  A  portion  of  the  legal  profession,  along  with  some 
members  of  the  bench,  characterise  self-represented  litigants  as  vexatious  or  frivolous 
litigants as well as the cause of much delay in the judicial system.103 Moreover, on occasion, 
the  legal  profession  and  its  regulator  have  been  criticised  for  their  resistance  to  the 
development of programs that would assist individuals to better represent themselves when 
faced with a legal problem.104 Both the legal profession and its regulator have characterised 
this resistance as protecting litigants from the risks associated with receiving incorrect or 
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misleading advice. However, a different explanation for the legal profession’s resistance is 
linked to the profession’s concerns about unrestricted competition as a result of non-lawyers 
being  better  equipped  to  handle  legal  matters  and  thus  no  longer  requiring  legal 
representation. This is a perceived threat to the legal profession’s longstanding monopoly on 
the  provision  of  legal  services.105 Changing these attitudes to include an approach that 
contemplates greater accommodation of self -represented parties runs contrary to the legal 
profession’s entrenched ideas about how the adversarial system works and the lawyer’s role 
within that adversarial system. 
Although based on different concerns, members of the judiciary do not escape some 
of these criticisms. Again, research data collected from self-represented litigants suggests that 
judges can seem unsympathetic and even antagonistic toward self-represented litigants who 
do not appear to understand the nature of the proceedings or the legal processes in their 
courtroom.106 In fairness to many judges who are confronted with significant numbers of self-
represented litigants on a daily basis, the y may be unsure of how to balance the self -
represented litigants’ needs in the courtroom with their own obligation to remain impartial as 
per their traditional role in the adversary system.107 Regardless of the underlying motivations, 
the results are the same; self-represented litigants often feel disempowered within the civil 
justice system. The challenge is to find ways to make the judicial system more hospitable to 
self-represented  litigants  without  compromising  the  integrity  of  the  justice  system. 
Accordingly, in light of the persistent barriers referenced above and the entrenched attitudes 
held  by  key  players  within  the  civil  justice  system,  the  continued  exclusion  and 
disengagement of non-lawyers raises questions about whether even well informed self -
represented litigants could be in a position to participate fully and effectively. 
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J.  POSSIBILITY OF MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In  addition  to  various  informational,  procedural  and  operational  barriers  that  impede 
participation by non-lawyers, there is also a substantive question about whose interests the 
civil justice system is in a position to serve. This question is particularly pertinent for those 
individuals attempting to assert a social justice agenda within the traditional court system. To 
the extent that the justice system only serves certain groups’ needs, enhanced participation by 
excluded groups may be characterised as empty or cosmetic. Notwithstanding the significant 
and growing number of self-represented litigants  engaged in the civil  justice system,  the 
existing legal system and the organisation of the legal profession have been criticised as 
being  primarily  designed  to  resolve  the  private  disputes  of  corporations  and  wealthy 
individuals  able  to  afford  legal  representation. 108 In answering the question of whether 
‘[Canada]  has  adequate  access  to  justice’,  Chief  Justice  McLachlin  commented  that  ‘the 
answer is no. Among those hardest hit are the middle class and the poor. We have wonderful 
justice for the corporations and for the wealthy’.109 In this regard, courts are characterised as 
‘venues that simply distribute power to power’.110 
In this regard, Gabel and Harris contend that the legal system and, more particularly, 
the court system serves to legitimate the existing power structures in society. This criticism is 
further reflected in the claim ‘the legal process is strongly aligned with the interests of the 
established  order  which  is  better  able  to  access  its  formidable  authority  and  institutional 
resources  in  order  to  resist  change  and/or  to  divert  those  transformative  efforts  into 
debilitating and decelerating channels’.111 Moreover, the adversarial structure of the justice 
system and the assumptions that underlie this structure – that each party has a trained legal 
representative who will advocate on the party’s behalf and from which a just result will be 
derived – starts to break down when only one party has an advocate who is familiar with the 
substantive law and legal procedures. In fact, the traditional adversarial framework becomes 
distinctly unfair when only one party is in a financial position to retain an advocate and, thus, 
unlikely to encourage meaningful participation. 
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Since the civil justice system is built on the resolution of individual cases,112 there is 
also  continued  s cepticism  over  whether  it  is  possible  for  individuals  who  are  already 
disempowered or disengaged from society to have any meaningful impact on the existing 
social and political systems through individual litigation cases. The very fact that individuals’ 
claims are isolated in the sense of being individualistic suggests that the system has a limited 
ability  to  reform  the  social  and  political  systems.  This  concern  is  magnified  when  the 
individual attempting to engage is a self-represented litigant. Thus, even if individuals are 
able to articulate a claim regarding their rights in the civil justice system, the overall impact 
of such a case may be minimal. To the extent that this portrayal is reflective of how the 
judicial system operates, the provision of information or skills that allow an individual to 
assert a claim and articulate a position in the civil justice system may fall victim to Arnstein’s 
criticism regarding empty participation which is reflected in an inability to redistribute power 
and resources.113 
 
K. SELF-HELP AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
Notwithstanding the criticisms that are leveled at the structure and organisation of the civil 
justice system and individuals’ ability to participate directly in the civil justice system, the 
question that remains is whether an access to justice initiative such as self-help legal services 
can play a role in facilitating participation. Moreover, given the principles and objectives of 
participatory democracy, whether an initiative such as self-help legal services are able to 
facilitate  or  enhance  participation  in  a  broader  societal  context.  The  criticisms  raised  in 
respect of the civil justice system would tend to suggest that meaningful participation by non-
lawyers  is  minimal  and  a  very  challenging  endeavor  for  any  self-represented  litigant. 
However, being cognisant of the educative function of participation and observing a concrete 
example of this function in the case of the Connecticut community lawyer, it is possible to 
see how an access to justice initiative such as self-help could, in theory, expand and multiply 
the opportunities for citizen participation. 
The purpose of civil law self–help centres is to provide self-represented litigants with 
the information and skills necessary for them to pursue their own legal issues without legal 
representation. 114 The  provision  of  legal  information  and/or  skills  arguably  allows  the 
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individual to  engage with  the civil  justice system  in  a more, if not  perfectly meaningful 
manner. By obtaining information that helps to demystify the substantive law as well as legal 
procedures,  individuals  might  feasibly be in  a  better position to  convey  their position to 
opposing  parties  as  well  as  members  of  the  judiciary. 115  Moreover,  through  direct 
participation in the legal process, the individual is afforded an opportunity to frame the legal 
problem in a manner that is more relevant to his or her life. To the extent that this results in 
the construction of laws that are more consistent with the organisation of ordinary citizens’ 
lives and reflective of their own conceptualisation of law and justice, self-help could play a 
role in advancing individuals’ meaningful participation. 
One of the challenges in this regard will be to ensure that while civil law self-help 
legal services continue to provide individuals with the legal tools necessary to engage in 
deliberation  and  decision-making  about  civil  law,  the  provision  of  legal  advice  and 
information will not result in the continued dependency on lawyers by non-lawyers.116 In 
other  words,  civil  law  self -help  centres  must  provide  individuals  with  the  information 
necessary to engage in the civil justice system and, at the same time, support the individuals 
in their efforts to disabuse themselves of the language of experts. In this regard, the existing 
framework, and those who act within it, will need to accommodate a new legal language that 
is nurtured and adopted by the citizens themselves rather than dominated by lawyers and 
judges. This discussion is theoretical in the sense that it assumes that to the extent t hat self-
help centres provides legal information, skills, and tools, individuals will be able to make use 
of the information and, in so doing, participate in and ultimately influence the development of 
the civil law. Given the existing legal framework with   all of its traditional notions of 
adversarial  proceedings  and  professionalised  participants,  the  question  that  remains  is 
whether this might be practically achievable.117 
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It  has  been  further  noted  that  the  ‘proliferation’  of  regulation  and  administrative 
bodies  that  govern  individuals’  lives  in  modern  society  have  not  simplified  life  for  the 
ordinary citizenry. Instead, it has made it more difficult for ‘people to know which agency to 
approach  with  what  problems,  or  how  to  organize  their  information  and  evidence  for 
presentation’.118 Given the proliferation of these various administrative and regulatory bodies 
and institutions, it is important that information provided through initiatives such as self-help 
legal services expand beyond technical information to the skills and tools necessary to engage 
in  these  institutions.  Similar  to  the  services  provided  by  the  community  lawyer  in 
Connecticut,  information  made  available  to  self-represented  parties  must  ensure  that 
individuals  are better able to  understand their  rights  and responsibilities  and identify the 
appropriate forum and process for addressing same. 
By providing individuals with information about the legal and political options and 
forums available to them in a broader educative sense, like the community lawyer working in 
the Connecticut community referenced above, self-help legal services offer an opportunity for 
individuals to gain legal knowledge as well as the practical means to access the different 
political and democratic institutions that impact their lives. For example, the individual may 
gain knowledge about which forum or process they need to engage as well as how to gather 
and organise information that they may need to submit in a particular institutional setting, and 
then  present  such  information  to  an  adjudicator.  The  inclusion  of  the practical  means  to 
participate further encourages opportunities for citizen participation outside of the specific 
context of the civil justice system and this, in  turn, promotes further engagement with a 
variety of government processes, forums and different decision-making capacities. 
 
L.  CONCLUSION 
Participatory  democracy  has  been  described  as  the  politics  of  amateurs,  whereas 
representative democracy involves the politics of specialists.119 One of the themes that I have 
discussed has involved the idea that the administration of law as a process has historically 
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been the exclusive domain of specialists. However, when a self-represented litigant seeks 
assistance from a legal self-help centre, the understanding is that the individual is proceeding 
without the traditional representation of expert legal counsel. As a result, self-represented 
litigants who do not rely on an intermediary (eg a lawyer or paralegal) to bring their matter 
before the court have an opportunity to directly impact the legal decision-making that is 
relevant to their particular legal problem, consistent with the ‘politics of amateurs’ rather than 
the  ‘politics  of  specialists’.  This  opportunity  to  be  heard  and  potentially  influence  the 
decision-making  process  can  impact  the  individual’s  perceptions  about  the  fairness  and 
justness of the particular process. Thus, to the extent those individuals believe that they were 
provided with an opportunity to ‘have a say’, they may be more inclined to believe they are 
entitled to a say and, more importantly, may begin to exercise a right to have a say in other 
contexts. 
Underlying these observations about the potential role of self-help is the assumption 
that direct participation by self-represented litigants must be supported by significant civil 
justice system reforms on both a procedural and substantive level. These reforms would need 
to  include  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  that  self-represented  individuals  are  able  to 
engage  in  the  civil  justice  system  in  a  meaningful  manner.  The  implementation  of  such 
measures would entail dismantling various operational and procedural barriers that presently 
impede  self-represented  litigants  from  participating  and  developing  new  procedures  and 
processes  that  take  account  of  non-lawyers’  needs  and  abilities.  As  noted  by  Benjamin 
Barber, these reforms cannot be implemented in a piecemeal fashion. These types of civil 
justice  reform  must  also  balance  the  requirement  that  the  legal  processes  be  fair  and 
consistent with the rule of law and, at the same time, take account of the practical realities of 
administering a legal system that includes a significant number of self-represented parties 
who are unfamiliar with those very legal processes or language. In addition, there is a need 
for a corresponding shift in attitudes of key insiders such as lawyers, judges and court staff. 
This  shift  involves  fundamental  questions  about  the  continued  adherence  to  the  existing 
adversarial  framework,  the  role  of  the  lawyers  and  judges  within  a  reconstituted  justice 
system, and the role of self-represented litigants within this framework. 
The first part of this paper made reference to a broader concept of access to justice 
that  contemplates  citizen  participation  in  all  of  the  law-making  and  law-administering 
institutions in society. In his article on access to justice, MacDonald stated ‘access to justice 
means most of all that people are able to find justice in their everyday encounters with public UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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officials; it is about transparency, accountability, integrity and ethics in the delivery of public 
services’.120 This interpretation of access to justice led MacDonald to question how it might 
be  possible  to  provide opportunities  for  ordinary  citizens  to  engage  fully  in  the  judicial, 
legislative  and  administrative  processes  through  which  law  is  made  and  administered.121 
Through participation in one aspect of society, citizens obtain the information, tools, and 
skills sets necessary to allow them to participate in other aspects of society. While the 
practices and procedures followed in the civil justice system may be very different  from the 
procedures  adopted by  city  council  when  holding  public  meetings,  the  fact  is  that  by 
participating in one forum individuals gain confidence, tools, and skills with respect to how 
political and democratic institutions are administered and how they might subsequently 
engage with other institutions or in other decision -making processes. This reinforces their 
willingness to further participate and empowers them to engage with other aspects of society 
in which they may wish to impact decision -making. It is in this way that Pateman suggests 
that participation becomes self-sustaining.122 Moreover, individuals’ engagement in decision-
making  processes  fulfills  important  needs  related  to  ‘voice’,  self-government,  and 
community-building – all of which are important aspects of a healthy democratic society. 
One limitation on this element of participatory theory pertains to the situation where 
individuals have a negative experience in the course of representing themselves in the civil 
justice system. Many of the self-represented litigants who attempt to manage their own legal 
matters, even with assistance from self-help centres, will lose their cases and, in the course of 
losing their case, be subject to significant consequences; these include monetary awards and 
judgments, loss of a home or property, and/or unfavourable custody arrangements. In these 
instances, the question remains whether an individual’s negative experience in the particular 
context of the civil justice system will override the individual’s willingness to participate in 
other  capacities.  This  potential  limitation  on  participation  is  heightened  by  the  practical 
reality that many self-represented litigants do not choose to represent themselves, but are 
compelled to do so because they cannot afford legal representation. Given the choice between 
participating  in  the  civil  justice  system  by  representing  themselves  or  having  counsel,  a 
significant portion of self-represented litigants would choose to retain counsel.123 In light of 
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this  consideration,  the  question  of  the  significance  of  a  negative  experience  on  future 
participation remains an important part of the discussion on access to justice initiatives and 
citizen participation. While it does not provide a complete answer to the potential impact that 
a negative experience may have on further participation, a partial response to this issue may 
lie in the strength of the measures that are taken to ensure that the civil law procedures are 
fair, transparent, and accessible to all individuals. 
While access to justice initiatives such as self-help legal services work within a less 
than perfect judicial system that is in need of further democratic reform, there are educative 
and  empowering  benefits  that  could  foster  further  citizen  participation  through  self-
representation in curial settings. To the extent that this is a goal worth pursuing, the challenge 
going  forward  is  to  examine  how  a  broader  conceptualisation  of  access  to  justice  might 
incorporate principles of participation and how those principles might be further reflected in 
the policy decisions and related programs that are developed to enhance access. This is a 
demanding  but  worthwhile  challenge  that  can  reap  considerable  benefits  for  those 
marginalised in a society that relies more and more on litigation and courts as a way of 
building a more just and inclusive society. 